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In a few years the human genome will be decoded completely. Our current 
knowledge of genetically determined dispositions to diseases will be 
significantly extended. Genetic tests with a hitherto unknown breadth, 
simplicity and reliability and based on electronic chips will be available. The 
development of embryonic stem cells will open the different stages in the 
development of life to manipulation by humans. And this will lead to an 
unknown and as yet incalculable broadening of the possibilities for genetic 
diagnostics and, in particular, gene transfer. 
How do we want to handle that broadening of possibilities? Can it be left to 
the free interplay of forces? Do we need rigid prohibitions? Or is there a 
third way? How would such a third way need to look in order to safeguard 
individual freedom while at the same time establishing the necessary 
limits? 
Everyone who has thought about the necessity for setting those limits 
knows how difficult it is. Where do we start? What are the points of 
departure on which we all agree and could base a consensus? And if we 
could find such a consensus, how can the established limits be enforced 
effectively? What we see here is a fundamental conflict in modern society: 
the freedom which it provides yields a significant increase in potential 
knowledge and practice. Yet just this potential causes effects which force 
us to restrict that freedom. 
We already know that the setting of limits cannot be achieved on a national 
level alone. Because the dynamics that drive the broadening of our 
potential knowledge and practice in research as well as in the market 
environment operate at an international level. For the setting of limits to be 
successful it must transcend borders at least with respect to basic 
standards, that is: it must occur at a European and international level. This 
then is the complete picture of the challenge we face: if the dynamics of 
scientific and technological development are not to be left to themselves 
and if not everything that can be done is done without societyís 
intervention, then we need a process of consensus formation which not 
only respects the pluralism within one society but also yields the sort of 
partial consensus which proves to be sufficiently dependable across 
national borders. 
I. 
The document which first confronted the European public with the whole 
weight of this problem and thus with the weight of the publicís problems 
was the draft of an 'European convention on the application of biology and 
medicine' to human beings, which was commissioned by the Committee of 
Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 
1991. 
The development of consensus formation in modern society regarding 
biomedicine began back in the late 1960s in the United States. It was 
sparked off by three factors: it was realised that the decision about who 
should have access to the new but inadequate number of dialysis places 
would mean that the chance of life would be allocated; it was understood 
that the emerging field of intensive medicine would be confronted with 
decisions for which there were virtually no criteria and procedures; and it 
was noticed that the intensive research into biomedicine which was 
suddenly taking place entailed the danger of abuse. 
The responses made to these challenges are characteristic: the new types 
of case-by-case decisions were packaged together and handed to an 
ethics commission to bring transparency to the alternative decisions, and, 
in addition to the work of this commission, academic institutions were set 
up, like the Kennedy Institute of Ethics or the Hastings Center, to attempt to 
clarify the new ethical questions via interdisciplinary studies and forms of 
curricular teaching, and, last but not least, an attempt was made to identify 
the accepted ethical principles from which the desired decision-making 
criteria and rules could be derived. At the same time, the tradition of 
common law helped: where there are no relevant court rulings, it permits 
recourse to recognised ethical principles. Back in 1947, on the basis of this 
tradition, and long before this trend began to emerge, the first document on 
scientific ethics of this type was produced: the Nuremberg Code on Human 
Experimentation, which was used in the Nuremberg trials on doctorsí 
criminal experiments during the Nazi time. This was a listing of ethical 
principles subsequently used in 1978 by the National Commission for the 
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research of 
the United States to formulate the ethical principles of research in the 
Belmont Report in addition to the National Research Act of 1974. The fact 
that the ethical dimension was integrated into the use of the new 
biomedicine in the United States earlier and more successfully than in 
Europe, and particularly in Germany, is probably largely due to this 
strategy. 
In Europe, the debate began later, and originated not from the experience 
of abuse but from the problem of regulating the new activities. Due to the 
fact that research and applications were increasingly developing on an 
international basis, in the 1970s the Council of Europe began to draft 
resolutions and recommendations designed to achieve a harmonisation of 
the minimum standards of national legislation. Since the legal tradition in 
continental Europe does not permit the direct recourse to ethical principles 
of common law, people turned to the ethical consensus formulated in the 
constitutions of the various countries and in the codes of human rights. 
However, it was increasingly felt that whilst these codes, mainly in the form 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950, can form the basic framework, they need 
to be further evolved to take account of the specific activities of 
biomedicine, so that a framework of principles and criteria can be 
formulated from which minimum legal standards can be derived for the 
various fields. It was decided in 1991 that this should take the form of a 
framework convention and supplementary protocols, i.e. additional 
international conventions referring to the various fields of application. 
Apart from the attempt by the Council of Europe to initiate the Europe-wide 
formation of a consensus about minimum legal standards in the area of 
bioethics, there has been the attempt by UNESCO to achieve a similar 
world-wide consensus, especially for the area of human genetics, through a 
General Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights. As a 
declaration it does not have the binding force of a ratified convention under 
international law; however, as a declaration of intentions by the agreeing 
member states ó and that agreement has now been given also at the level 
of the United Nations ó it represents an important impulse for world-wide 
adherence to the necessary minimum standards. 
The first draft of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and 
Medicine ó known also by shorter titles, an earlier one: Bioethics 
Convention and a later one: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
ó which the Council of Europe had called for, was tabled in 1994. After an 
intensive debate and critique by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe and in the member states, especially in Germany but also in 
Austria and to a lesser degree in France, the draft was revised and the final 
version accepted by the Committee of Ministers in September 1996. In 
April 1997 it became available for signature and ratification by the member 
states. Since then, about two thirds of the 40 member states of the Council 
of Europe ó among them France ó have signed and partly ratified the 
convention. In Germany and Austria this step is still outstanding because 
the public debate is continuing. Since November 1997 a protocol 
prohibiting the cloning of human beings has found similar acceptance. In 
February this year, the Committee of Ministers passed the first draft of a 
protocol about organ transplantation for public discussion. In due course 
this protocol will be followed by a protocol about medical research. 
Preparatory work is also being carried out for protocols on human genetics 
and embryo protection. 
II. 
What then are the main principles of the basic document: the Convention 
on Human Rights and Biomedicine? What is the core of the legal and moral 
consensus which it sets out? What distinguishes it from the American 
approach as encountered in the Belmont Report is the fact, that the 
European approach is not a collection of individual principles which may be 
regarded as shared maxims. Rather, it starts out from the notion of human 
rights, which it links to a complex of principles which may be called the 
teleology of medical practice. The notion of human rights serves two 
important functions: under the title 'inviolability of human dignity', it puts at 
the top the respect for persons (autonomy), the first principle of the 
Belmont Report. But it takes into consideration that the human being, 
because of its capacity to be a moral subject, must always be regarded as 
an end in itself which is united with a psycho-physical nature. For the basic 
(human) rights protect not only self-determination and unhindered 
development of oneís personality, both of which are directly entailed by 
being a moral subject; they also protect as inviolable the basic natural 
conditions without which such a subject cannot exist. This is most evident 
in the basic right to the integrity of oneís body and life, which entails the 
right to life, that is: a prohibition to kill, which protects all human beings. As 
is well known, there are reasons to hold that the combination of these basic 
rights entails a further one: the right to health care. 
That approach from the notion of human dignity and the right to self-
determination, it entails, is most evident in Article 5 of the convention; it ties 
all medical interventions to the informed consent of the patient. This turns 
into international law a trend which began around the middle of this 
century, most particularly with the Nuremberg Code on Human 
Experimentation; that trend has had an increasing influence on medical 
ethics and law and signals the end of a medical practice which one may 
call paternalistic. 
However, it must be noted that the convention had previously, in Article 4, 
tied the principle of informed consent to the principle of binding all medical 
intervention to the relevant 'professional standards and obligations', i.e. to 
what we might call the professional consensus of the medical practitioners 
as expressed in national and international guidelines. At the core of this 
consensus is not only the commitment to use all therapeutic means only 
lege artis, but also to do so for one goal alone: to heal or alleviate the 
illness of the patient who has come for help, that is for the goals of 
diagnosis, therapy and prevention of diseases. There are several 
references to this in the convention; it talks of health purposes in Article 18, 
of preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes in Article 19, of the benefit 
of health in Articles 8 and 17, of the therapeutic benefit in Article 19, and of 
the potential of life-saving in Article 20. 
This highlights two things: that the convention draws on two moral and 
legal sources, and that it combines two complexes of moral and legal 
principles in a significant way. Both sources on which the consensus 
expressed in the convention draws are sources of experience. It has been 
the experience of abuse, even the abuse of medical research and practice, 
which has made the notion of human rights plausible and accepted world-
wide and beyond cultural differences; it is the experience of need and aid 
which links doctor and patient, i.e. that ethics of care which has yielded 
professional standards that transcend borders. 
Each of those complexes of moral and legal principles ó the notion of 
human rights with its central principle of self-determination and the ethics of 
care ó is clearly a necessary, though not sufficient condition for the moral 
and legal norms needed for contemporary biomedicine. Only a combination 
of the two allows medicine to avoid extremes, that is: to avoid the 
paternalism of the traditional doctor-patient-relationship as well as the 
degeneration into a mere service industry. 
III. 
No doubt it would be interesting to investigate the link between the two 
complexes of moral and legal principles by going through the individual 
chapters of the convention. The first chapter contains the general rules, 
states the protection of human dignity and rights in Article 1, and postulates 
the priority of the individual over the interests of society and of science 
(Article 2) as well as the guarantee of equal access to health care for 
everyone (Article 3). The second chapter goes beyond the already 
mentioned binding of all medical intervention to Informed Consent (Article 
5) and deals with the protection of persons who cannot give their consent 
(Article 6), suffer from psychiatric disorders (Article 7) or have to be treated 
in an emergency situation (Article 8), as well as living wills (Article 9). The 
third chapter is dedicated to the issue of the protection of privacy and 
contains the relevant regulations (Article 10). The fifth chapter deals with 
scientific research and criteria for its safety (Article 16), especially to protect 
people who cannot give their consent (Article 17); it also regulates research 
on embryos and prohibits the production of embryos solely for the purpose 
of research (Article 18). The sixth chapter regulates the taking of organs, 
particularly from persons who cannot give their consent (Articles 19 and 
20), and prohibits the dealing with organs as well as the use of donated 
body parts for any other than the declared purpose (Article 22).) 
But since a detailed analysis of the 14 chapters and 38 articles of the 
convention would take too much time I will restrict myself to a discussion of 
the regulations on genetic diagnosis and gene transfer in chapter 4. In this 
chapter article 11 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of genetic make-
up and Article 14 the choice of gender. These prohibitions are a direct 
result of the protection of individual dignity in Article 1. For if human beings 
have dignity and if dignity signifies a worth which, according to Kant, unlike 
a price has no equivalent by which it could be substituted, then any value 
judgement which made the worth of human beings dependent on their 
genetic make-up or their (genetically determined) gender would violate that 
dignity, which they have simply by virtue of being human beings. 
Similarly in Article 13, the prohibition of any genetic manipulation of the 
germ cell line, results from a personís right to self-determination. For if a 
manipulation of the genome affects all future carriers of that genome we 
would have to be able to presume their consent beyond reasonable doubt. 
The defence of this type of genetic manipulation for therapeutic reasons 
claims that that consent may be presumed where the manipulation of the 
genome is directed precisely at a gene which is responsible for an inherited 
disease of a grave nature. However, the regulations of Article 13 of the 
convention do not allow for even that exception. If one is looking for 
reasons beyond the risks of such an intervention and the fact that it could 
only be established on the basis of research on persons who cannot give 
their consent, one could argue that the therapeutic goals in question are 
neither universal nor precise enough to justify an intervention which is as 
far-reaching as the genetic manipulation in the germ cell line. 
On the other hand, in Article 12 the convention relies on the notion of a 
medical teleology to limit the use of predictive genetic testing for diseases 
to, as it is called, health purposes. It also ties such testing to genetic 
counselling and thus to the principle of self-determination, which entails a 
personís right to know as well as not to know. Both conditions: the 
presence of health purposes and of genetic counselling, effectively bind 
predictive genetic testing to the doctor-patient relationship and a relevant 
diagnosis, i.e. to medical indications. 
There is no other area than the regulation of predictive genetic testing for 
disease dispositions where the convention restricts the right to self-
determination so directly by reference to medical teleology. It is obvious 
that the convention assumes that genetic diagnosis is an intervention which 
is no less in need of justification than any other medical intervention and 
that therefore the patientsí wishes alone are not a sufficient justification. 
Here the convention follows the self-regulation imposed by the 
recommendations and guidelines of several national professional bodies. 
Future developments will show whether these restrictions continue to meet 
with a consensus strong enough to avoid the obvious potential for the 
abuse of existing or newly developed diagnostic kits in drug stores. 
The significance of the conventionís approach to the regulations on human 
genetics becomes apparent in a comparison with the regulations of the 
UNESCO declaration. In the first draft of this declaration, the human 
genome is regarded as a 'common heritage of mankind' and as such 
worthy of protection. Regardless of whether 'the human genome' exists as 
a specific genome other than in the form of an abstraction from the many 
individual genomes, this raises the question whether the notion of a 
'common heritage of mankind', which was developed with respect to the 
ocean floor or the moon in order to prevent individual property claims, can 
be meaningfully applied to the human genome. The desire that all countries 
should participate in the results of genetic research is understandable; and 
the protection of minorities threatened by genetically determined diseases 
is important. Yet the protection of the human genome can only be 
guaranteed via the protection of the individualís dignity and rights. For the 
protection of the specific genome can only be justified as an integral part of 
the protection of the individual genome. If the protection of the specific 
genome were the primary goal, eugenics or other interventions which 
neglect the interests of the individual could not be ruled out. Consequently, 
the draft of the UNESCO convention underwent significant corrections, 
which had the effect that the classical notion of individual human rights has 
become its pivotal point. In its individual regulations, too, the final version of 
that declaration is formed along similar lines of the convention. 
Because the convention of the Council of Europe defines only a framework 
it contains no further regulations on human genetics. For instance, it does 
not deal with the problems of prenatal diagnostics or of the genetic 
screening of entire populations. Neither does it deal with the problem of 
passing on the results of predictive genetic tests. All those questions are 
the subject of a protocol on human genetics, which the Committee of 
Ministers has requested and which meanwhile is in preparation. 
IV. 
What relevance does this European and international process of 
consensus formation and its results have for the moral and legal handling 
of human genetics? Will limitations based on the doctor-patient relationship 
be effective? And will the two aforementioned complexes of moral and legal 
principles resist the spiral of want which results from the demands of the 
people and the supply of the market? 
Only by being bound to medical practice and the notion of disease can the 
use of genetic diagnostics be protected from an unfettered 
commercialisation, and also from its wanton use in the labour market and 
the insurance industry. It is precisely the notion of disease which allows us 
to distinguish gene transfer for the purpose of therapy from that of 
enhancing a particular trait.  
To be sure, there remain questions and grave problems. Does not an 
understanding of health as general well-being, embraced by the World 
Health Organisation, make it illusory to use the concept of health as a 
moral and legal criterion? Even if the delineation is not always entirely 
clear, medical practice and its largely uncontested reliance on the 
diagnosis of diseases suggests that the delineation is workable and that 
any concept of health which does not recognise this will indeed remain 
illusory. That is why the combination of the two criteria can rule out the 
abuse of new techniques for the purposes of eugenics understood as a 
deliberate improvement of the genetic pool. For such an improvement 
regards the individual only as a means and does not care about the 
individual but only the common good. 
However, can the two criteria of self-determination and presence of health 
purposes counter the spiral of want which results from the unfortunate 
combination of conflict situations, technical possibilities, economic interests 
and social pressure? Nothing presents the problem of that spiral more 
clearly than prenatal diagnostics and inheritable genetic manipulation, i.e. 
genetic manipulation of the germ cell line. On the one hand prenatal 
diagnosis frees parents from unnecessary fear, allows them to have 
children even if they have a disposition to a severe disease, and can 
possibly contribute to that disease no longer being passed on to future 
generations. On the other hand there is the grave burden which is the 
knowledge of a positive diagnosis, the connection with abortion, which 
contradicts the protection of life, and effectively a preventive eugenics. 
However, the proponents of the genetic therapy of the germ cells argue 
that all these could be avoided if a timely diagnosis of the genetic 
disposition to a severe disease allowed a targeted therapy of the gene in 
which the disease is coded. 
Indeed, the therapeutic goals appear to justify the magnitude of the 
intervention, in contrast to the gene transfer for the purpose of 
enhancement. Yet, it is not only the fact that effects and side-effects cannot 
be controlled but also the far reaching causality which casts doubt on the 
moral legitimacy of such an intervention. For none of the future carriers of 
the altered gene can be asked for consent; yet the distinction between 
disease dispositions for which the consent of future gene carriers can be 
assumed and others for which that is certainly not the case is not as clear 
as is necessary to assume that consent. In the 1980s the Council of 
Europe therefore rightly guaranteed future generations the right to an 
unmanipulated genetic heritage; and in the human rights convention on 
biomedicine it rightly prohibits the gene transfer in the germ cell line even 
for therapeutic purposes. 
However, will not the knowledge from the human genome project still lead 
to a scenario in which human beings become creatures which can be 
biologically perfected, the scenario of 'Wonderwoman and Superman' (J. 
Harris): ageless, free of disease, endowed with all desirable dispositions, 
yet deprived of their own humanity? 
What makes the dream of producing the perfect human being appear 
realistic in the first place is the widespread idea of genetic determinism or 
essentialism, which reduces all relevant causes to the genetic code. 
However, as all human geneticists know very well, molecular genetic has 
destroyed nothing more comprehensively than that idea. If difference is 
normal and not sameness, if diversity is normal and not universality, if a 
polygenetic causal mechanism is normal and not a monogenetic one, then 
the concepts of genetic normality and genetic health are equally obsolete. 
So it is science itself which shows us the limits at the same time as it opens 
up new possibilities. Molecular genetics is integrating its insights into 
broader, more complex patterns of explanation. All this confirms the insight 
that the same evolutionary mechanism which through mutation caused our 
possibilities and our potential is also the cause of our limitations and 
defects; and that therefore by nature disease is part of health ó like death is 
part of life ó as much as death and disease must be understood as 
challenges. 
The scientific results refer us back to the dialectic which is part of the 
human condition itself. As a being which is both restricted by its body and 
able to control it, the human being is facing a nature with which it is at once 
identical. It is this 'excentric position' (H. Plessner) which makes human 
beings artificial by nature; it allows them to view their bodies as objects ó a 
condition which makes medical diagnosis and therapy possible in the first 
place; at the same time it puts limits on objectifying the body and rules out 
arbitrary interventions. Human beings are not merely alive, they have to 
lead their lives; and as such they must master those limits, not be mastered 
by them. That is why informed consent to a medical intervention and its 
binding to a disease diagnosis play the role I have described above. 
V. 
To sum up. No doubt, the development of molecular biology during the 
second half of this century has opened up new worlds and thrown up new 
challenges. It has given us knowledge about the foundations of life on 
which we cannot go back and which will play a key role in all future 
understanding and treatment of life. That knowledge has turned life into an 
object of technology which goes far beyond, for example, the traditional 
techniques of breeding. It has also made human beings themselves the 
object of actions in a way which was hitherto unknown. What will become 
of these possibilities depends on whether human beings will succeed, on 
the strength of their own discernment, to limit the technically possible to the 
humanly beneficial. The new knowledge itself will be crucial here. For the 
new understanding of life as a complex network of interactions clearly 
indicates the limits of the old understanding of nature as a linear causal 
process of a technomorphous kind. The understanding of life as a complex 
network must be combined with an appreciation of the limits of nature. In 
the end, however, we ourselves must strike the right balance between 
intervention and restriction. That balance is not handed to us by nature, nor 
can it be enforced against it. We have to find and apply it ourselves. Only 
self-imposed, transnational limits will counter the temptation into which our 
own knowledge may lead us. 
 
 
  
